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This  paper  examines  the  effects  of  political  agreements  on  regional  financial  integration  (RFI)  on 
financial  market  development  and  access  to  and  cost  of  finance  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa.  Our  results 
suggest that RFI positively affects financial development – measured very broadly as the size of the 
financial sector, including the liabilities of the central banks – when combined with a sufficient level of 
institutional quality. If institutional quality is below a threshold level, RFI apparently has negative effects 
on financial development. However, we can find no significant effects of RFI on the size of the private 
financial sector or on the efficiency of the banking sector. Regarding the effects of RFI on access to and 
costs of finance of enterprises in SSA, our results are mixed. We can find no significant effect of RFI on 
access to finance for all firms in the aggregate, but the results indicate that RFI actually impedes small 
firms’  access  to  finance.  Furthermore,  there  is  a  significant  positive  influence  of  foreign  bank 
involvement on the severity of the credit constraint for small enterprises, while we don’t find such an 
influence for large enterprises. These results provide some support for the foreign bank barrier hypothesis 
in the context of RFI. 
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There is a growing number of studies on financial integration in various regional integration projects 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (see e.g. UNECA and AU, 2008; UNECA and SADC, 2010; Lovegrove et al., 
2007;  Bhatia,  2009;  Jansen  and  Vennes,  2006).  These  contributions  strongly  (and  sometimes 
exclusively)  emphasise  the  potential  merits  of  regional  financial  integration  (RFI)  resulting  from 
economies of scale; stimuli for domestic financial reforms; increased competition and innovation; 
expanded opportunities for risk diversification; etc. These assumed benefits are predominantly based 
on theoretical arguments that are habitually made both in the debate on financial globalisation and 
RFI. The key assertion in the literature is that RFI is beneficial since it entails financial development. 
The empirical evidence, however, is lacking. 
Against  this  backdrop,  the  aim  of  this  study  is  to  critically  review  the  arguments  made  in  the 
literature and examine whether measurable effects of RFI on financial market development and access 
to finance exist in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. RFI is defined as the process of opening up 
capital accounts among countries of geographical proximity, including a liberalisation of cross-border 
activities of financial institutions within the integrating area. This process is two-dimensional, caused 
by market forces (e.g., foreign bank penetration) and political institutionalisation (e.g., harmonisation 
of payment systems, regulatory harmonisation, and regional institutional development). RFI is to be 
distinguished from global financial integration (or financial globalisation), which refers to a country’s 
entrance in global financial markets by removing its capital controls vis-à-vis other countries (cf. 
García-Herrero and Wooldridge, 2007, p. 58). In particular, this study investigates whether and how 
countries involved in a RFI project differ from other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of 
financial development and firm’s financing conditions. For this purpose, we gather data on financial 
market development, cost of and access to finance, cross border financial flows, membership in an RFI 
project, and institutional development from various sources (including IMF (2008); Bureau van Dijk 
Electronic  Publishing  (2010); World  Bank  and  International  Financial  Corporation (2010);  Knack 
(1999)) and apply cross-country regressions based on an approach first proposed by Chinn and Ito 
(2006). Our results suggest that RFI positively affects financial development when combined with a 
sufficient  level  of institutional  quality.  However,  we  also  find that  RFI  appears to  have  negative 
effects on access to finance for small enterprises. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The following section defines the relevant key terms. 
Section 3 reviews the theoretical literature on the benefits and costs of international and regional 
financial integration. Section 4 gives a brief overview of the regional context, i.e. financial markets in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the three Regional Economic Communities (RECs). In Section 5 we then 
investigate  empirically  the  effects  of  RFI  on  financial  development  and  financing  conditions  for 
enterprises in SSA. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Definitions 
We use the term Regional Economic Community (REC) in the sense of the Abuja treaty (cf. AU, 1991) 
that provides the foundation for the African Economic Community (AEC). It defines an REC as a bloc 
of countries which coordinate their economic activities and which form a part of the AEC. Currently, 
the African Union acknowledges eight regional cooperation projects as building blocs of the AEC. 
These building blocs and their sub-groups form 14 RECs in SSA. 
Defining RFI in general terms is quite easy. However, in order to compare countries which engage in 
RFI with others that do not we need a specific working definition of RFI. The literature usually 
distinguishes between de facto and de jure measures of financial integration (cf. Kose et al., 2006a).  
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De jure measures aim to quantify the degree of legal restrictions on capital movements (e.g. Chinn 
and Ito, 2006). Since the formal removal of capital controls does not necessarily imply the actual 
occurrence  of  cross-border  capital  flows,  de  facto  measure  try  to  estimate  the  amount  of  capital 
exchanged between economies (see e.g. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2003). 
Given serious constraints on data availability of bilateral financial flows in SSA, we have to suffice 
with a de jure measure of RFI that assesses legal restrictions on capital flows. To this end, we apply a 
qualitative approach. In particular, we regard an REC as an RFI project if it meets the two following 
conditions. First, a formal agreement must be met by all member countries on all topics listed in Table 
2.1. Those criteria are regarded by UNECA and SADC (2010) as key elements of RFI. Second, there 
must be no overlapping membership by a significant number of member countries with other RFI 
projects. Wakeman-Linn and Wagh (2011) argue that overlapping membership structures negatively 
affect the implementation of RFI due to potential political dissent. We thus exclude RECs which meet 
the first condition but have overlapping memberships on the assumption that RFI implementation is 
not highly developed in RECs with overlapping memberships. 
 
Table 2.1: Elements of RFI 
- Removal of capital controls 
- Regulatory and supervisory harmonisation 
- Creation of regional institutions 
- Harmonisation of payment systems 
Source: Compiled by authors based on UNECA and SADC (2010) 
 
3. Theoretical considerations 
This section reviews the theoretical literature on financial integration. It is structured in two parts. 
First, we review the theoretical costs and benefits of financial integration, regardless whether it takes 
place in regional or a global context. We then discuss some specific aspects relating to RFI that are not 
relevant  in  the  case  of  financial  globalisation.  In  order  to  keep  the  descriptions  short,  we  will 
concentrate on the arguments relevant to developing countries. 
 
3.1 Financial integration: Benefits and reservations 
3.1.1  Benefits 
Most of the theoretical literature maintains that financial integration is beneficial because it entails 
macroeconomic growth and stability (cf., García-Herrero and Wooldridge, 2007). While most of the 
proponents  of  financial  integration  agree  on  this,  there  are  diverging  views  on  the  transmission 
channels through which financial integration effects growth and stability.
1 
                                                 
 
1 Various studies mention more merits of financial integration than growth and macroeconomic stability, for 
example  financial  development.  One  can  disagree  if  financial  development  is  an  end  itself  or  a  supportive 
element for the broader goal of overall growth. But this is rather a matter of conceptualisation than of the 
substance of the arguments. For the sake of order we thus  understand all the other ‘goals’ as transmission 
channels through which growth and stability are affected.  
 
4
The  arguments  can  be  structured  in  two  groups.  The  first  group  represents  an  “earlier  wave  of 
financial globalisation literature” (Kose et al., 2006b, p. 1) deriving from the neoclassical tradition. 
The arguments of the second group are more recent and were mostly developed as a response to a lack 
of  empirical  evidence  for  the  earlier  theoretical  predictions.  The  first  group  asserts  that  financial 
integration achieves macroeconomic growth and stability directly, whereas the second group proposes 
that the effects are rather indirect (see Mishkin, 2007). 
Direct  effects  of  financial  integration:  The  early  literature  encompasses  four  direct  benefits  of 
financial integration: increased domestic investment, spill-over effects of foreign direct investment, 
consumption smoothing and international risk sharing. 
First, financial integration is supposed to enhance domestic investment by providing a larger pool of 
funds  for  domestic firms.  If  a  low level  of income  constraints a  country’s  ability  to  create large 
savings, and if the costs of capital on international markets do not exceed the marginal return of 
domestic investment projects, domestic enterprises can borrow on international capital markets. This 
should increase domestic investment and economic growth in the respective country. 
Proponents  of  this  theoretical  view  underline  the  implications  of  this  concept  for  developing 
countries. They argue that developing countries have a lower capital-labour ratio. This results – other 
things  equal  –  in  lower  marginal  labour  productivity  and  lower  wages  and,  given  the  law  of 
diminishing returns, in a higher marginal product of capital. Therefore, the neoclassical framework 
predicts that capital should flow from industrialised to developing countries (cf. Lucas, 1990). 
Second, the early literature emphasises the specific benefits of foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI is 
described as a transmission channel of technological and managerial knowledge (see e.g. MacDougall, 
1960; Borensztein et al., 1998; Berthelemy and Démurger, 2000). Positive effects of such transfers 
are, for instance, higher skilled human capital and lower costs to introduce new varieties of capital (see 
Borensztein et al., 1998, for a formal exposition). 
Third,  financial  integration  should  enable  countries  to  borrow  funds  from  international  capital 
markets in times of economic distress and lend in better times, Financial integration should thus lead 
to consumption smoothing. By reducing the volatility of consumption, financial integration it therefore 
expected to positively affect macroeconomic stability (e.g., Agénor, 2010). 
In a similar manner, risk diversification is regarded as an important benefit of financial integration. 
Investors who are residents of a financially integrated country can diversify between different types of 
domestic  and  foreign  assets.  Thereby,  risk  can  be  shared  internationally  which  allows  aggregate 
reduction of risk and higher macroeconomic stability (e.g., Obstfeld, 1998). This is highly relevant for 
developing  countries  whose  domestic  markets  provide  little  opportunity  for  asset  diversification, 
which is often related to low diversification of the real economy.
2 
Indirect benefits of financial integration: The traditional theory has been seriously challenged on two 
grounds. First, empirical research does not find a positive correlation between financial integration and 
economic growth (cf. Kose et al., 2006b), and sometimes even a negative one (cf. Gourinchas and 
Jeanne, 2007; Prasad et al., 2007). Second, international investment flows do not show the patterns 
predicted by neoclassical theory. In contrary, capital flows rather from developing to industrialised 
countries, as it has been outlined by Lucas (1990). 
                                                 
 
2 A thin production base is especially prevalent in developing countries with a colonial past, which applies to 
almost the entire SSA region, since colonial regimes tended to implement agricultural production of only one 
good in their colonies. In some cases, the colonial policy created production structures which persist until today 
(cf. Rodney, 2003).  
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As  a  response,  the  newer  theoretical  literature  emphasises  the  indirect  benefits  of  financial 
integration.  Kose  et  al.  (2006b,  2007)  provide  a  framework  for  the  indirect  benefits  of  financial 
integration. They argue that the merits of financial integration manifest in “collateral benefits” (Kose 
et al., 2007, p. 44). This term describes unintended, yet positive, side-effects of financial integration. 
Kose  et  al.  identify  three  main  susceptible  areas  for  such  collateral  benefits:  financial  sector 
development, institutional quality, and macroeconomic policy. 
Financial development – defined as an increase in the size and the efficiency of the financial sector 
(Mishkin,  2007)  –  can  be  enhanced  by  the  penetration  of  foreign  financial  institutions  into  the 
integrating country. As argued by Mishkin (2007) as well as Rajan and Zingales (2003) one important 
potential  consequence  of  financial  integration  is  the  reduction  of  financial  repression.  Financial 
repression  describes  a  situation  where  a  country’s  financial  system  is  poorly  developed  because 
powerful  politico-economic  actors  (so-called  “incumbents”)  prevent  further  development  of  the 
financial system. The involvement of foreign financial institutions can break open such structures 
characterised  by  monopolies,  government-owned  financial  institutions  or  both,  leading  to  more 
efficient and less costly financial intermediation and, hence, financial development (see Baldwin and 
Forslid, 2000). 
Furthermore,  the  entrance  of  foreign  financial  intermediaries  should  also  stimulate  institutional 
development. Foreign institutions from countries with higher regulatory standards may introduce “best 
practices” (Mishkin, 2007) to the financial sector of the host country, and thus help to implement 
prudential regulation and improve the stability of the domestic financial sector. Due to their outsider 
status, they have an interest in minimising information asymmetries which typically represent a more 
severe  problem  for  foreign  financial  institutions  than  for  domestic  ones.  Therefore,  international 
financial institutions  have  an  incentive  to  enforce  accounting  standards  and  regulations (Mishkin, 
2007). 
And finally, international financial integration is viewed as having positive effects on a country’s 
macroeconomic  policy.  Inadequate  economic  policies,  like  unsustainable  fiscal  policies  or  a 
malfunctioning regulatory system, are thought to encourage capital outflows and, consequently, higher 
domestic interest rates. This creates pressure on policymakers and therefore an incentive for them to 
implement prudential macroeconomic policies (Obstfeld, 1998; Kose et al., 2007). 
 
3.1.2  Obstacles, limits, and costs 
Having outlined the potential benefits of financial integration as predicted by theory, we will now turn 
to the potential problems associated with financial integration. We will first discuss the “threshold 
conditions”  for  successful  financial  integration  and  succinctly  review  the  potential  costs  that 
international financial integration might entail. 
 
Threshold conditions for successful financial integration  
An insufficient economic, political, or institutional environment can counteract the merits of financial 
integration. That, in turn, implies that certain prerequisites must be prevalent in an integrating country 
to allow it to benefit from financial integration. Kose et al. (2006b, p. 35) term those prerequisites 
“threshold conditions”. They identify four such thresholds: financial sector development, institutional 
quality, quality of domestic macroeconomic policies, and trade integration. According to them, the 
absence or insufficiency of any of the threshold conditions can limit or counteract potential positive 
effects of financial integration.  
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Financial development is important for financial integration, because a larger and more efficient 
financial sector is more likely to channel capital inflows to its most productive uses. However, this 
channelling of capital inflows will be limited if the financial sector is poorly developed. 
Institutional quality is also important because it mainly affects “not just the outcomes of financial 
integration but the actual level of integration” (Kose et al., 2006b p. ), since economic and political 
institutions constitute the framework for the implementation of financial integration. 
Similarly, the quality of macroeconomic policies affects the composition of inflows, since sound 
policies tend to attract not only more capital inflows, but also relatively more FDI and equity inflows. 
Such inflows require investors’ confidence in the macroeconomic stability of the host country. 
Fourthly, Kose et al. point to the importance of a country’s exchange rate policy. The “impossible 
trinity”  of  international  macroeconomics  stipulates  that  countries  cannot  maintain  financial 
integration, an exchange rate peg, and autonomy of monetary policy at the same time. Therefore, 
assuming that developing countries need to align their monetary policy - at least to some extent - 
towards domestic goals, they face a trade-off between financial integration and a pegged exchange 
rate. For this reason, Kose et al. regard flexible exchange rates as a special threshold condition for 
financial integration. 
Finally, Kose et al. regard trade integration as an important precondition for financial integration, 
since economies whose real economy is relatively isolated from the rest of the world are more likely to 
suffer  from  the effects of  financial  crises  associated  with  financial  integration.  Closed economies 
cannot compensate the contraction of domestic aggregate demand triggered by a financial crisis by 
exports, and are therefore more vulnerable when opening up their capital markets. 
 
Potential costs of international financial integration 
While  most  of  the  literature  on  financial  integration  has  focussed  on  the  supposed  benefits  of 
international financial integration, there are also critical perspectives. One potential cost of financial 
integration  derives  from  its  influence  on  the  effectiveness  of  other  macroeconomic  policy  tools. 
Opening the capital account is likely to diminish a country’s monetary policy autonomy, even if it 
employs flexible exchange rates.
3 
Financial integration can also have adverse effects on the competitiveness of a country’s export 
sector  and  therefore  on  overall  economic  growth. The  transmission  channel behind  those  adverse 
effects is the  real  exchange  rate.  When capital flows  into a  country,  it  appreciates the country’s 
currency in real terms. This decreases the competitiveness of domestic goods and makes investment in 
tradables less profitable. Therefore, investment in the export sector recedes and aggregate spending 
diminishes. This effect is in particularly harmful for developing countries depending on commodity 
export (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2008; Rodrik, 2008). 
In addition, financial integration can create tremendous costs in the form of financial crises. There 
are various mechanisms behind the nexus between financial integration and financial crisis. First, an 
opening  of  the  capital  account  changes  the  behaviour  of  domestic  banks.  If  domestic  banks  are 
allowed to lend abroad, this can entail two adverse types of behaviour. On the one hand, banks tend to 
expand  their  lending  activities  abroad  in  businesses  in  which  they  have  only  limited  experience. 
Typically, the supervisory bodies lack the expertise to supervise the new lending activities of the 
banks on international capital markets. As a result, the number of non-performing loans of banks 
                                                 
 
3 For a review of the empirical literature on this issue see Reade and Volz (2011).  
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increases and the balance sheets of financial institutions begin to deteriorate. If this process continues, 
banks come under the suspicion of potential or actual failure. This can erode the trust of depositors in 
their banks leading to bank runs, banks panics, and even more failing institutions (Mishkin, 2007, p. 
276). On the other hand, a similar mechanism can occur with regards to capital inflows. If domestic 
institutions  start to  obtain  loans  from  abroad  they  typically  pay  high  interest  rates,  while  foreign 
lenders view their investment as being implicitly protected by the host government or the IMF. This 
impression of safety is reinforced if the country has a fixed exchange rate regime, giving “foreign 
investors a sense of lower risk” (Mishkin, 2007, p. 276). This inflow of capital entails excessive 
lending  by  financial  institutions,  either  domestically  or  abroad,  thus  triggering  the  same  process 
described above. 
Second, financial integration can increase the likelihood of financial crises due to the volatile nature 
of international capital flows. In extreme cases countries can experience an unanticipated withdrawal 
of  short-term  capital  -  so-called  sudden  stops  (Calvo  and  Reinhart,  2002).  Theory  provides  two 
explanations for such reversals of capital: herding behaviour and contagion. Contagion describes the 
phenomenon  of  a  “loss  of  confidence  in  the  economic  prospects  of  a  country,  as  a  result  of 
developments elsewhere” (Agénor, 2010, p. 1100). Herding occurs when a high number of investors 
“charge into risky ventures without adequate information and appreciation of the risk-reward trade-
offs and, at the first sign of trouble, flee to safer havens” (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000, p. 279). In 
the absence of capital controls both contagion effects and herding behaviour can cause rapid outflows 
of capital from an integrated country with adverse economic and social consequences. 
Finally,  financial  integration  could  also  have  adverse  effects  on  financing  conditions  for  small 
enterprises.  There  are  two  explanations  why  financing  conditions  for  small  enterprises  can  be 
negatively affected in the context of financial integration - the “large bank barriers hypothesis” and the 
“foreign-owned bank barrier hypothesis” (Berger et al., 2001). The large bank barriers hypothesis 
argues as follows: efficient lending depends on how much reliable information banks can obtain about 
their customers. One particularly efficient lending form is “relationship lending” which describes the 
process of gathering information about borrowers “beyond the relatively transparent data available in 
the financial statement and other sources” through “contact over time with the firm, its owner, and its 
local community on a variety of dimensions” (Berger et al., 2001, p. 2). Large banks find it difficult to 
extend their lending activities to smaller firms, since they cannot gather information about them via 
relationship  lending.  This  can  lead  to  reduced  lending  to  smaller  enterprises  by  large  financial 
institutions. As argued by Chick and Dow (1994), higher competition in the banking sector, which 
correlates with the international integration of banking, entails a concentration of the banking sector. 
Financial integration that leads to a concentration in banking could thus result in diminished access to 
finance for small firms. 
In a similar line, the foreign-owned bank barrier hypothesis argues, similarly to Mishkin (2007), that 
foreign  banks  have  disadvantages  compared  to  domestic  financial  institutions  due  to  information 
asymmetries. Foreign banks, like large banks, find it typically more difficult to engage in relationship 
lending  and  extend  credit  to  smaller  businesses  which  are  more  likely  to  encounter  problems  in 
adhering to standardised credit procedures than large firms. Foreign banks, therefore, tend to “cherry-
pick their clients” (Volz, 2008, p. 22), i.e. they will tend to lend to larger enterprises. Thus, if a 







3.2 Regionalism vs. globalisation 
Having reviewed the potential benefits of and problems with international financial integration, we 
will now address some theoretical issues relating specifically to RFI. A number of recent studies argue 
that  RFI  is  associated  with  specific  benefits  others  than  those  of  financial  globalisation  (see  e.g. 
UNECA and AU, 2008; UNECA and SADC, 2010; Wakeman-Linn and Wagh, 2011; Bhatia, 2009; 
García-Herrero and Wooldridge, 2007). 
There are three main arguments for RFI – as opposed to integration into global financial markets – in 
the  literature.  The  first  underlines  the  positive  implications  of  RFI  created  by  cooperation  in 
institutional and political issues. García-Herrero and Wooldridge (2007, p. 59) point out that RFI is 
more  likely  to  generate  benefits  on  the  institutional  side  than  financial  globalisation  because  the 
creation  of  regional  institutions  requires  a  much  more  intensive  engagement  in  institutional 
development than the removal of capital controls. With regards to politics, Bhatia et al. (2009, p. 30) 
argue that RFI can entail benefits in the political sphere by providing “powerful incentive for domestic 
financial  reforms”.  Although  those  arguments  correctly  state  that  RFI  puts  a  stronger  focus  on 
institutional development and policy issues, they are just another version of the collateral benefits 
argument proposed by Kose et al. (2006a). They merely state that the degree of those benefits should 
be higher in RFI than in financial globalisation. 
A second group of arguments emphasises the effects of RFI on financial development in terms of size 
and efficiency. Concerning the size of the financial sector, UNECA and SADC (2010, p. 5) asserts that 
“bringing together scarce savings” is a major merit of RFI. From this point of view RFI serves as a 
pooling mechanism to consolidate otherwise lowly developed financial markets to a larger market for 
funds available to potential private debtors in the region. With regard to the efficiency of financial 
intermediation, García-Herrero and Wooldridge (2007) argue that geographical proximity can mitigate 
information  asymmetries,  due  to  a  more  extensive  exchange  of  information.  This  allows  a  more 
efficient allocation of financial resources. Correspondingly, Bhatia et al. (2009, p. 30) assert that “RFI 
reduces transaction costs and increases the effectiveness of financial institutions”. This point of view 
is  connected  to  the  notion  that  RFI  entails  economies  of  scale  by  concentrating  financial 
intermediation  within  a  region.  The  advantages  of  economies  of  scale  and  less  information 
asymmetries are indeed specific potential features of RFI, relying on the geographical proximity of 
RFI not given in the case of financial globalisation. In contrast, the argument of the consolidated 
savings merely replicates the argument of the direct effect of financial integration due to a larger scope 
of available funds. 
A  third  line  of  arguments  focuses  on  the  positive  effects  of  RFI  on  financing  conditions  for 
enterprises. UNECA and AU (2008, p. 122) highlight the fact that RFI includes “several advantages 
[...], particularly for small and medium-sized firms. Integration could also remove certain forms of 
credit constraints [...]. The law of large numbers guarantees less exposure to credit risk as the number 
of clients increases”. Creditors prefer to provide loans in an RFI area because it enables them to 
diversify risk among a large group of debtors. This argument draws upon the risk diversification 
argument outlined in the previous section, although with a focus on its effects on financing conditions 
for small enterprises. However, as we mentioned earlier, financial integration can also inhibit access to 
finance for small enterprises. We will examine this aspect in detail in the empirical part of the study. 
Negative aspects of RFI are barely discussed in the literature as compared to those of financial 
integration in general. Some studies mention implementation problems as an obstacle for RFI. One 
particular  problem  can  occur  when  different  RFI  projects  with diverging  harmonisation  standards 
overlap (see Wakeman-Linn and Wagh, 2011), i.e. when countries of one RFI project also participate 






4. Regional context 
The  SSA  region  currently  encompasses  14  RECs  (Table  4.1).
4  All  of  the  47  SSA  countries  are 
members of at least one REC. On average SSA countries participate in three economic cooperation 
projects. Table A.1 shows which countries are members in which REC. Almost all RECs put a strong 
focus on trade integration, and some are monetary unions. 
 
Table 4.1: Regional Economic Communities in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2010 
West- and Central Africa 
Economic Community of West African States      ECOWAS 
West African Monetary Zone        WAMZ 
Economic Community of Central African States     ECCAS 
L’Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine    UEMOA 
Communaut Èconomique et Montaire de l’Afrique Centrale  CEMAC 
Southern Africa 
Common Markets of Eastern and Southern Africa    COMESA 
Southern African Development Community      SADC 
Southern African Customs Union        SACU 
Common Monetary Area          CMA 
East African Community          EAC 
SSA and beyond 
Union du Maghreb Arabe          UMA 
Commission de l’Ocean Indien        COI 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development      IGAD 
Community of Sahel-Saharan States        CEN-SAD 
Note: RECs of African Economic Community are reported. 
Source: Compiled by authors based on AU (2011) and Metzger (2008). 
 
However,  only  a  few  of  these  RECs  engage  in  RFI  that  meets  our  definition  outlined  above. 
Analysing the political agendas and agreements of the 14 RECs, as well as the literature dealing with 
politico-economic progress in those regions, with regards to the RFI criteria presented in Table 2.1 we 
identified four RECs  that tend towards financial market integration (cf. Wakeman-Linn and Wagh, 
2011). Those four RECs are the East African Community (EAC), the Common Monetary Area, the 
L’Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine (UEMOA) and the Communauté Économique et 
Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC). 
East African Community (EAC): The EAC has focused on the removal of capital restrictions among 
their founding  members within the last  decade (see  East  African  Community,  2010a). The treaty 
establishing the East African Community (1999) highlights the importance of banking and capital 
market integration. It focuses on the harmonisation of the regulatory and supervisory frameworks 
(Article 85b), promotion of “co-operation among the stock-exchanges, capital markets and securities’ 
regulators” (Article 85g), as well the harmonisation of “capital market policies on cross-border listing, 
                                                 
 
4 We focus on the RECs which are officially acknowledged by the African Union as well as their subgroups (cf. 
AU, 2011).  
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foreign portfolio investors, taxation of capital market transactions, accounting, auditing and financial 
reporting  standards,  procedures  for  setting  commissions  and  other  charges”  (Article  85c). 
Furthermore,  the  member  countries  agreed  to  “ensure  the  unimpeded  flow  of  capital  within  the 
Community” (Article 86a). Recently the EAC has put a stronger emphasis on the harmonisation of 
payment  systems  by  setting  up  the  East  African  Payment  System  (EAPS)  (see  East  African 
Community, 2010b; African Trade Policy Centre, 2010). 
Union  Économique  et  Monétaire  Ouest-Africaine  (UEMOA):  In  UEMOA  there  are  no  legal 
restrictions on capital in- and outflows (cf. Wakeman-Linn and Wagh, 2011).
5 Since 2004, banks are 
allowed to operate in all member countries with one single permit (cf. Sy, 2007). Various institutions 
have  been  created  on  a  regional  level.  For  example,  the  supervision  and  regulation  of  the  entire 
banking  sector  in  the  region  is  conducted  by  the  Commission  Bancaire  de  l’UEMOA,  which  is 
controlled  by  the  regional  central  banks  (cf.  Banque  Centrale  des  États  de  l’Afrique  de  l’Ouest, 
2008a). There is a regional stock and bond market - the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières. It 
was created in 1998 and is supervised by the regional supervisory commission Conseil Régional de 
l’Epargne Publique et de Marchés Financiers (cf. Sy, 2007, p. 99). Furthermore, the UEMOA set up 
the so called Syst`eme de Transfert Automatis´e et de Règlement dans l’UEMOA (STAR-UEMOA) 
which implements modern payment systems on a regional level (cf. Banque Centrale des États de 
l’Afrique de l’Ouest, 2008b, 2006). 
Communauté  Économique  et  Monétaire  de  l’Afrique  Centrale  (CEMAC):  CEMAC  resembles 
UEMOA in terms of the institutionalisation of RFI. There is a uniform banking law for the entire 
region. Banks are allowed to operate in the entire region with a single permit (cf. Wakeman-Linn and 
Wagh, 2011). Regional institutions are in place. Supervision and regulation of the banking sector is 
conducted  by  the  Commission  Bancaire  de l’Afrique  Centrale (COBAC)  (cf.  Wakeman-Linn  and 
Wagh, 2011). In 2003 the Bourse des Valeurs Mobilières d’Afrique Centrale (BVMAC), a regional 
stock  exchange  was  established.  It  is  supervised  by  the  Commission  de  Surveillance  du  Marché 
Financier  Régional  (cf.  COSUMAF,  2010).  In  2003  the  Banque  des  Etats  de  l’Afrique  Centrale 
(BEAC)  launched  a  reform  project  which  “focuses  on  harmonization  of  payment  and  settlement 
instruments and the standardization of formats for information and data exchange amongst various 
participants.” (African Trade Policy Centre, 2010, p. 3) 
Common Monetary Area (CMA): The CMA member countries have formally agreed on the removal of 
capital controls (cf. Wang et al., 2007). In contrast to the other RECs projects, the formal integration 
process of financial markets in CMA is marked by the supremacy of one dominant player - South 
Africa. Article 5 of the CMA Agreement states that the prescriptions of the regulation and supervision 
of the financial markets and the banking sector of South Africa also apply to other CMA member 
countries (Wang et al., 2007). The South African Exchange Control Regulations states that “Namibia, 
Lesotho and Swaziland should be treated as part of the domestic territory and not as foreign” (South 
Africa Government, 2007, p. 4). Moreover, the payment systems of the small CMA members are 
aligned to South African standards and “[a]s a result of these structures, the banking sector in all CMA 
countries complies with international banking standards and regulations” (Metzger, 2008, p. 5), since 
South Africa itself implemented international standards in terms of regulation and payment systems. 
The requirements outlined in Table 2.1 are therefore met, although the integration process is politically 
centred in South Africa and not on a supranational basis. Furthermore, the de facto data on RFI 
activity that are available for the CMA due to higher reporting standards of South African banks show 
                                                 
 
5 The combination of UEMOA and CEMAC constitutes what is known as the zone of the franc Communauté 
Financière Africaine (CFA franc zone). The two different currencies of UMEOA and CEMAC are both pegged 
to the euro.  
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that South African banks are active in the entire CMA region (e.g., Metzger, 2008). For this reason we 
consider CMA as an exception with regards to overlapping membership. 
RECs  with  overlapping  membership  structures:  Several  other  RECs  mention  financial  market 
integration in their agenda. However, in practice, the focus appears to be on trade integration, with RFI 
not being a topic of priority. Furthermore, a stronger emphasis on RFI would face various problems on 
the  political  level  for  other  RECs  “due  to  a  lack  of  political  commitment  in  member  countries” 
(Khandelwal, 2004, p. 10). For example, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and 
the Common Markets of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) tried to launch a payment system 
harmonisation project, yet, it lacks serious acceptance by their member countries (see African Trade 
Policy Centre, 2010), which is arguably due to overlapping memberships (cf. Wakeman-Linn and 
Wagh, 2011). Seven countries have a membership in both SADC and COMESA.
6 This is already more 
than half of all SADC member countries. In fact, no single SADC member is only a SADC member; 
COMESA  only  includes  three  countries  which  are  not  members  of  other  RECs.  We  also  find 
overlapping membership patterns in the cases of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). ECOWAS includes 
two other RECs, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) and UEMOA, as well as Cape Verde and 
Liberia. The WAMZ member countries, in turn, have not yet taken political steps towards RFI and 
Liberia’s commitment is limited due to its post-conflict status (cf. West African Monetary Institute, 
2007).  ECCAS  includes  the  CEMAC  region  and  five  other  countries.  Its  members  show  little 
commitment to extended RFI (ECCAS, 2007). The other RECs have not included RFI in their agenda 
(see COI, 2006; Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2010; SACU, 2002). 
 
5. Empirical analysis of the costs and benefits of RFI 
We now turn to an empirical investigation of the effects of RFI on the financial sectors of SSA 
countries. We proceed in two steps. We first analyse the effect of RFI on financial development. We 
then estimate the effects of RFI on the financing conditions of enterprises. 
 
5.1 RFI and financial development 
An extensive empirical literature investigates the effects of general financial openness on financial 
development by using cross-country data (see for instance Levine, 1996; Claessens et al., 2001; Chinn 
and Ito, 2006) or panel data of individual countries (see Barajas et al., 2000; Clarke et al., 2000; Unite 
and Sullivan, 2003). There is also a growing number of quantitative studies examining the effects of 
RFI on financial development. An example is Espinoza et al. (2010) who found a positive connection 
between RFI and stock market development for the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
However, empirical research in SSA on RFI is relatively rare. Wakeman-Linn and Wagh (2011) 
provide some descriptive analysis arguing that member countries of RFI projects do not significantly 
differ  from  non-member  countries.  Jansen  and  Vennes  (2006)  compare  RFI  with  international 
financial integration from the perspective of SSA countries, yet they only identify potential benefits in 
terms  of  financial  sector  efficiency  gains.  They  argue  that  the  gains  are  higher  for  financial 
globalisation  than  for  RFI.  In  a  qualitative  investigation  Lovegrove  et  al.  (2007)  point  out  that 
membership in CMA contributes more to financial development than SACU membership. 
                                                 
 




5.1.1  Data and methodology 
We  follow  the  approach  of  Chinn  and  Ito  (2006),  who  analyse  the  relation  between  financial 
development  and  general  capital  account  openness  with  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  analysis, 
including an interaction term. They measure the degree of general openness with an index (the Chinn-
Ito-Index) which is calculated on the basis of data on legal restrictions of cross-border capital flows 
from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER; see 
International Monetary Fund, 2010). They apply their regression to a broad array of least developed 
countries and emerging markets. 
We replicate Chinn and Ito’s regression, modifying one variable in order to measure RFI instead of 
general financial openness. In our specification, the Chinn-Ito-Index is replaced by a dummy (RFIj), 
indicating  the  membership  of  the  respective  country  in  a  RFI  project (cf.  Section 4).  Our  model 
specification is as follows: 
FDjt - FDj(t-4) = α0 + α1RFIj(t-4) + α2Lj + α3(RFIj(t-4)Lj) + α4FDj(t-4) + α5GDPj(t-4) + α6(CPIjt – CPIj(t-4)) 
+ α7OPENECj(t-4) + εj 
The variables are defined as follows. 
Financial development: FDjt denotes the level of financial development in country j in period t. Thus, 
the term FDjt − FDj(t−4)  represents the average growth rate of financial development over a four-year 
period. We use the average of the period from 2004 to 2008. Following Mishkin’s (2007) definition of 
financial development as an increase in the size and the efficiency of the financial sector, we use five 





The first two indicators measure the size of the financial sector. PCGDPj is a measure of the activity 
of private financial intermediaries. It is a very common indicator of the size of the financial sector (see  
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e.g. Volz, 2008; Beck et al., 2000). LIQUIDj is the broadest measure of the size of the financial sector. 
It  includes  “currency  plus  demand  and  interest-bearing  liabilities  of  banks  and  other  financial 
intermediaries divided by GDP” (Beck et al., 2010). NIMGj, CIRj, and OVHDj are all measures of the 
efficiency of the banking sector. NIMGj denotes the net interest margin. It equals the ratio of the net 
interest revenues of all banks to their total earning assets. OVHDj equals the overhead costs of all 
banks as a fraction of their total assets. CIRj is the cost-income ratio of banks. It describes the ratio of 
the overhead costs of all banks to their gross revenues. High values of these three variables indicate 
low efficiency of the banking sector. We draw these data from Beck et al. (2010), whose dataset 
encompasses various other indicators of the financial structure of SSA countries, including indicators 
for financial sector efficiency. However, in most of the cases there are large gaps in the dataset, so that 
the sample size is too small for a regression analysis. This is especially true for data on bond and stock 
market  development.  Beck  et  al.  (2010)  also  provide  detailed  explanations  about  the  calculation 
method on which the data are based. 
As was pointed out, our regression will not include level data for the dependent variable, but the four 
year average growth rates of the indicators described above. The growth rates are shown in Table 5.1. 
We use the average growth rate between 2004 and 2008, because within this period the most data are 
available. 
 
Table 5.1: Average growth rates of financial development in SSA between 2004 and 2008 
 
Growth rates, 2004-2008  N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std. Dev. 
SSA (Whole sample) 
PCGDP  46  -0.2275  0.4233  0.0375  0.0922 
LIQUID  46  -0.3606  0.1887  0.0465  0.0913 
NIMG  41  -0.0614  0.0784  -0.0034  0.0312 
CIR  41  -1.3132  1.0555  -0.1292  0.4191 
OVHD  42  -0.0878  0.0292  -0.0141  0.0240 
SSA (excl. ZAF and ZWE)                
PCGDP  44  -0.2275  0.1334  0.0251  0.0605 
LIQUID  44  -0.3606  0.1887  0.0465  0.0930 
NIMG  39  -0.0614  0.0784  -0.0049  0.0308 
CIR  39  -1.3132  1.0555  -0.1270  0.4272 
OVHD  40  -0.0878  0.0292  -0.0144  0.0244 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Beck et al. (2010). 
 
RFI: We measure RFIj with a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the country is a member of an 
RFI project, and 0, if not. We argued in Section 4 that CMA, UEMOA, CEMAC, and EAC should be 
regarded as RFI projects. The country dummy of country j thus takes the value 1, if it has been a 
member in one of those four RECs in 2004 (cf. Table A.1). We assume lags in the potential effects of 
RFI  membership on financial development so that it will take time for RFI to create measurable 
outcomes. This is taken into account by the RFI dummy, since there has been no change in the  
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membership structure of either CMA, UEMOA, CEMAC or EAC within the decade preceding 2004. 
Since Burundi and Rwanda joined the EAC only in 2007 (see allAfrica, 2007) we do not count them 
as RFI countries because we assume that potential effects of RFI would not have had enough time yet 
to unfold. Between 2004 and 2008 there have been no other changes in the membership status of RFI 
countries. 
We are aware that the usage of such a coarse indicator for the RFIj variable limits the explanatory 
power and reliability of our analysis. However, given the lack of data for bilateral financial flows for 
most countries in SSA, we consider this to be the only feasibly approach to investigate the effects of 
RFI in this region.
7 We will discuss the various negative implications on the interpretability of our 
results in detail below. 
Institutional  development:  In  Section  3  we  mentioned  that  various  studies  highlight  institutional 
development as an important precondition for deriving positive effects from RFI. We thus include a 
variable for institutional development to test its role in enhancing financial development. 
To measure institutional quality we rely on indicators from three different sources: the Worldwide 
Governance  Indicators  (WGI)  published  by  the  World  Bank  (2010d),  data  taken  from  the  Wold 
Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA; World Bank 2009) as well as the State 
Fragility Index (SFI) published by the Center or Systemic Peace (2009).
8 
The WGI dataset encompasses six indicators measuring the quality of governance in 128 countries, 
three of which measure institutional quality in particular. The measures are regulatory quality (RQj), 
rule of law (ROLj) and control of corruption (CCj). The values range from minus 2.5 (low institutional 
development) to 2.5. (high institutional development). 
The CPIA dataset includes one general measure for the average quality of public sector management 
and institutions (CPIAj) calculated by the average value of five sub-indicators on the enforcement of 
property  rights,  the  quality  of  budget  and  financial  management,  the  efficiency  of  revenue 
mobilisation, the quality of public administration, as well as transparency and accounting. (cf. World 
Bank 2009). The values range from 0 (low development) to 5 (high development). 
The SFI measures the level of state fragility which is strongly connected to the absence of institutions 
channelling economic activities. It is calculated on the basis of eight sub-indicators. The highest level 
of fragility is denoted by the value 25, the lowest by zero. We calculate the average of each indicator 
for the period 2004 to 2008, except for the CPIAj measure which is only available from 2005. 
In  addition,  we  include  an  interactive  term,  RFIj(t−4)Lj,  which  shows  the  combined  effect  of 
institutional  development  and  RFI  on  financial  development.  We  already  pointed  out  that  theory 
predicts a positive relation between institutional and financial development. Furthermore, institutional 
                                                 
 
7 We also tested the Chinn-Ito-Index in our regression instead of the RFI dummy. Unfortunately, this index has 
the same value for almost all SSA countries and, therefore, provides no interpretable results. Furthermore, it is 
not a measure for RFI but for general financial openness. Thus, it does not contribute to the research question at 
hand. 
8 Other studies, including Chinn and Ito (2006), use data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to 
measure institutional development. However, those data are available only publicly available for the years 1984 
to 1997 (which is the timespan that Chinn and Ito used for their regressions). Running the regression with the 
ICRG data leads to results which are very similar to those reported below. However, given that the ICRG data 
are somewhat outdated we refrain from reporting the results here; they are available on request. Apart from the 
ICRG data, Chinn and Ito (2006) employ the legal measures provided by La Porta et al. (1998) which are 
commonly used as indicators of institutional quality. However, since this dataset includes only four SSA 
countries it cannot be used for our purposes.  
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development is seen as a prerequisite as well as an indirect benefit of RFI (cf. Kose et al., 2006a). We 
thus expect the combined effect of RFI and institutional development in our regression results to be 
positive. 
Control variables: Finally a vector of control variables is included in the specification. While the 
literature provides theoretical justification of a broad array of variables that could be determinants of 
financial development, there is no consensus on which variables should be included in an estimation. 
Here we will follow Chinn and Ito (2006) and apply only a small set of control variables, due to our 
small sample size. In particular, we use the natural log of GDP in 2004 (GDPj), average inflation 
between 2004 and 2008 (CPIj), and trade openness in 2004 (OPENECj, which is the ratio of imports 
and  exports  to  GDP).  Higher  financial  development  is  associated  with  more  complex  economic 
structures that go along with higher income. High inflation distorts the decision processes of economic 
actors and may encourage them to save in real goods rather than financial assets. The link between 
financial  development  and  trade  openness  is  supported  by  empirical  literature  (Beck,  2002).  The 
sources  for  the  data  are  Beck  et  al.  (2010),  World  Bank  (2010c),  and  Heston  et  al.  (2009), 
respectively. Furthermore, we include the level of financial development in 2004 (FDj(t−4)) as a control 
variable.  This  variable  is  included  because  the  initial  level  of  financial  development  is  likely  to 
influence the growth rates of the following period. 
 
5.1.2  Results 
Tables 5.2-5.6 depict the results of our regression analysis. Tables 5.2., 5.3. and 5.4 present the 
estimations for each indicator of institutional development from the WGI dataset (CCj, ROLj, and 
RQj). Table 5.5 shows the results for the CPIAj data, and Table 5.6 reports the results for the SFIj. In 
each Table, Columns 1 to 5 display the results for the sample including all SSA countries for the 
different measures of financial development. Columns 6 to 10 show the results when outliers are 
excluded.
9 There are no problems with multicollinearity. 
The results in Tables 5.2-5.4 show significant coefficients for the RFIj variable when the dependent 
variable is LIQUIDj and outliers are excluded. At the same time, we find significant coefficients for 
the institutional development variables ROLj and RQj in the LIQUIDj regression when outliers are 
excluded. CPIAj also has a significant coefficient in the LIQUIDj regression. 
However, since our specification includes an interactive term, we cannot interpret the coefficients of 
RFIj or the institutional quality variables independently. If we want to filter out the influence of RFI on 
financial development, we have to calculate the total effect of RFIj (cf. Chinn and Ito, 2006). This is 
done for a given value of institutional quality by summing up the effects of the RFIj variable and the 
interaction  term  predicted  by  our  model.  Furthermore,  if  the  OLS  coefficient  estimate  of  the 
interaction term is significant, then the total effect is also significant. Therefore, we can calculate the 
total effect for the results where we find a significant estimate (with p < 0.05) for the interactive term, 
i.e., Column 7 of Table 5.2, 5.3, 5.4. and 5.6.
10 An overview of the total effects is given in Table 5.7 
                                                 
 
9 A value is defined as an outlier when it is two standard deviations above or below the average (cf. Chinn and 
Ito, 2006). 
10 We calculate the total effects presented in Table 5.7 as (FDj(t-4) – FDj)* = α1RFIj(t-4) +α3(RFIj(t-4)Lj)s+xM. 
The equation shows the total effect (indicated by the asterisk) of the variable RFIj(t−4) on the annual growth rate 
of  financial  development  FDj(t−4)  −  FDj  for  a  given  level  of  institutional  quality  Lj.  s  denotes  the  standard 
deviation and xM the mean of the annual growth rate of financial development. The effect of joining an RFI 
project is the difference between the total effect when RFIj is one and the total effect, when it is zero. If it is zero,  
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for the non-RFI countries.
11 The results have to be interpreted carefully. They show us how, according 
to our model predictions, the financial sector size of an individual country would be affected if the 
respective country joined an RFI project, given its respective level of institutional quality. 
For example, a country like Madagascar, which has an average control of corruption index of minus 
0.096 (on a scale between minus 2.5 and 2.5), would increase its growth rate of liquid liabilities by 6.1 
percent,  whereas  Nigeria,  with  a  CCj  value  of  minus  1.11,  would  find  its  liquid  liabilities  ratio 
decreasing by 5.8 percent. Similarly, Cape Verde which has an average rule of law index of 0.518 
(also on a minus 2.5 to 2.5 scale) would increase the average growth rate of its liquid liabilities by 12 
percent, whereas the Democratic Republic of Congo would experience a decline by 10.8 percent due 
to a low rule of law index of minus 1.73. 
When using RQj as a measure of institutional development we find that the growth rate of Liberia’s 
liquid liabilities to GDP ratio would decrease by 12.3 percent because RQj accounts for minus 1.53. In 
contrast, the growth rate of Mauritius’ financial sector is estimated to increase by 16.7 percent due to 
its regulatory quality index of 0.53. 
Using SFIj as a measure of institutional development, the results are again in line with the previous 
estimations. For instance, the growth rate of the financial sector of Sierra Leone would be negatively 
affected by RFI decreasing by 11.4 percent due to its relatively high level of state fragility (21 on a 
scale between 23 and zero). The opposite is true for Ghana which has a SFIj of only 14 and would see 
the growth rate of its financial sector increase by 4.8 percent according to our estimations. 
The  results  in  Table  5.7  are  largely  consistent,  irrespective  of  which  institutional  development 
indicator is used. The effect of RFI on the growth rate of liquid liabilities to GDP for the average level 
of institutional quality is minus 0.2 percent for the CCj variable, minus 1 percent for the rule of law 
variable, minus 3 percent for RQj, and minus 3.3 for the SFIj. This implies that on average the effects 
of RFI on financial sector development in SSA is rather small or negative given the relatively low 
level of institutional development prevalent in most SSA countries. Overall, our results reconfirm 
earlier contributions that have emphasised the importance of the economic, political and institutional 
environment for successful financial integration. 
Furthermore we can calculate the average level of institutional development which is necessary to 
enable a positive effect of RFI on financial development. We find that, in terms of the control of 
corruption index, a minimum level of minus 0.62 is required to channel RFI to an increase in the size 
of the financial sector in terms of liquid liabilities to GDP. The rule of law index must be at least 0.67 
and the regulatory quality index at least 0.64. The SFIj must not exceed 16 in order to make RFI 
beneficial in terms of growth benefits of the financial sector. We can interpret these values as the 
threshold conditions described by Kose et al. (2006b). Our results suggest that countries with low 
institutional quality should be careful or even stay away from engaging in RFI until their institutional 
quality  has  reached  a  level  where  they  can  actually  benefit  from  RFI.  This  underlines  the  great 
importance of getting the sequencing of financial opening right to avoid adverse effects. 
However, one has to be cautious in interpreting Table 5.7. The estimated effects for some countries 
are very high, and they should not be understood as an elaborate prediction of the effects of RFI on a 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
the  whole  equation  becomes  zero  too.  Therefore,  the  total  effect  of  RFI  on  financial  development  is: 
(FDj(t-4) – FDj)* = α1+α3Ljs+xM. 
11 We restrict our analysis to non-RFI countries, since the interpretation of the total effect of RFI membership on 
countries that are already involved in RFI projects makes little economic sense. It would show us the effect of 
RFI on a RFI member country for the hypothetical situation that the respective country was not an RFI member.  
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single country, but rather as an illustration of the relation between institutional development and the 
effectiveness of RFI for financial development. 
A few more qualifications are apposite. First, the effects calculated in Table 5.7 are based on the 
assumption that differences in the effect of RFIj on LIQUIDj are causally determined by differences in 
the level of institutional quality. This interpretation derives from the threshold conditions argument 
stated by Kose et al. (2006a). However, the data provide no insight into the establishment of causality. 
It could also be possible that institutional quality has a different effect on the relation of institutional 
quality  and  LIQUIDj  depending  on  the  value  of  RFIj.
12  Our  interpretation  is  therefore  based  on 
theoretical reasoning, not on information we extracted from the data analysis. 
Second, since we only obtained significant results in Columns 2 and 8 of Table 5.3 and Column 7 of 
Table 5.5. we could only discuss the effects of RFI on the size of the financial sector measured as the 
ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. This measure, however, also includes the liabilities of the central 
bank. Therefore, our results give no information about the particular effect of RFI on the size of the 
private financial sector. This limitation becomes even more severe for the interpretability of our results 
with respect to the fact that the private financial sector in most SSA countries is relatively shallow 
compared to central bank liabilities. Based on data from Beck et al. (2010), we can calculate the 
average  ratio  of  deposit  money  banks  to  central  bank  assets.  It  accounts  for  23.75  percent.  This 
supports the notion that our results may display the effect of RFI on central bank liabilities rather than 
on the size of the private financial sector. 
Overall, our results suggest that RFI affects the overall size of the financial sector of SSA countries 
positively  if  a  sufficient  level  of  institutional  quality  is  prevalent.  If  a  country  lacks  institutional 
quality,  RFI  negatively  affects  the  size  of  the  financial  sector.  However,  we  cannot  identify  any 
particular positive effect on the size of the private financial sector. Furthermore, we did not find a 
significant effect of RFI on the efficiency of the banking sector, or on the size and efficiency of stock 
markets. 
 
                                                 
 
12 It might come to mind that differences in the relation between LIQUIDj and institutional quality depending on 
the value of RFIj could be interpreted in terms of collateral benefits of RFI (outlined in section 3). But the 

























Table 5.2  
Regression results: Regional financial integration, financial development, and institutional development (Control for Corruption [CCj]) 
 
    SSA            excl. outliers       
Dependent Var.  PCGDP  LIQUID  NIMG  CIR  OVHD    PCGDP  LIQUID  NIMG  CIR  OVHD 
Num.of Obs.  46  46  41  41  42    44  45  39  40  42 
R square    0.434          0.552          0.222          0.600          0.178            0.141          0.405          0.458          0.545          0.134         
Adj.R square  0.269          0.409          - 0.081          0.453          - 0.110            - 0.132          0.206          0.221          0.358          - 0.185        
Column    [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]    [6]  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10] 
Coeff.  RFI  0.181           - 0.346          0.041          - 0.211          - 0.187            - 0.462          - 0.530 **      0.482          - 0.223          - 0.272        
    [0.219]        [0.214]        [0.304]        [0.239]        [0.302]          [0.295]        [0.248]        [0.292]        [0.263]        [0.313]       
  CC  - 0.415          0.220          - 0.373          - 0.137          - 0.042            - 0.130          - 0.681          0.369          0.033          - 0.103        
    [0.300]        [0.373]        [0.355]        [0.257]        [0.387]          [0.475]        [0.466]        [0.359]        [0.284]        [0.395]       
  INT[CC,RFI]  0.362          0.085          0.227          0.172          0.137            0.041          0.748 **      0.102          0.042          0.020         
    [0.240]        [0.278]        [0.356]        [0.248]        [0.369]          [0.364]        [0.344]        [0.329]        [0.271]        [0.372]       
  FD[t-4]  0.596 ***   - 0.859 ***   - 0.356          - 0.730 ***   - 0.208            - 0.275          - 0.025          - 0.366          - 0.726 ***   - 0.255        
    [0.197]        [0.271]        [0.260]        [0.182]        [0.243]          [0.322]        [0.299]        [0.250]        [0.194]        [0.252]       
  GDP  0.117          - 0.003          0.151          - 0.121          0.171            0.068          - 0.006          - 0.034          - 0.057          0.146         
    [0.229]        [0.207]        [0.328]        [0.188]        [0.270]          [0.289]        [0.227]        [0.292]        [0.208]        [0.284]       
  CPI  0.086          - 0.358          - 0.059          - 0.176          0.018            - 0.287          - 0.721 **      0.380          - 0.229          - 0.183        
    [0.224]        [0.219]        [0.317]        [0.276]        [0.328]          [0.302]        [0.258]        [0.288]        [0.296]        [0.343]       
  OPENEC  - 0.158          - 0.060          0.049          - 0.049          - 0.036            - 0.064          0.349 *       - 0.120          - 0.037          0.001         
    [0.189]        [0.184]        [0.248]        [0.167]        [0.226]          [0.249]        [0.185]        [0.209]        [0.189]        [0.238]       
Notes:  Point estimates from OLS; heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.  * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, **signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ***signiﬁcant at 1 percent. 
Dependent variable is the average growth rate of ﬁnancial development between 2004 and 2008. RFI is measured by a dummy variable taking the value 1, if a country is member of 
an RFI project, and otherwise 0. 

























Table 5.3  
Regression results: Regional financial integration, financial development, and institutional development [Rule of Law [ROLj]] 
 
    SSA            excl. outliers       
Dependent Var.  PCGDP  LIQUID  NIMG  CIR  OVHD    PCGDP  LIQUID  NIMG  CIR  OVHD 
Num.of Obs.  46  46  41  41  42  44  45  39  40  42 
R square    0.475          0.542          0.265          0.612          0.193          0.159          0.457          0.425          0.553          0.138        
Adj.R square  0.322          0.396          - 0.021          0.469          - 0.090          - 0.108         0.276          0.173          0.368          - 0.179        
Column      [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]    [6]  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10] 
Coeff.  RFI  0.099          - 0.376 *       - 0.048          - 0.259          - 0.135          - 0.404         - 0.593 **      0.372          - 0.290          - 0.201        
    [0.213]        [0.214]        [0.304]        [0.239]        [0.313]        [0.285]        [0.234]        [0.316]        [0.265]        [0.327]      
  CC  - 0.520 *       0.222          - 0.455          - 0.195          0.170          0.296          - 0.903 **      0.109          - 0.121          0.138        
    [0.257]        [0.319]        [0.309]        [0.220]        [0.328]        [0.436]        [0.404]        [0.320]        [0.236]        [0.336]      
  INT[ROL,RFI]  0.364 *       0.062          0.245          0.225          0.014          - 0.087         0.760 **      0.252          0.150          - 0.143        
    [0.208]        [0.230]        [0.325]        [0.222]        [0.320]        [0.319]        [0.276]        [0.305]        [0.233]        [0.324]      
  FD[t-4]  0.652 ***   - 0.884 ***   - 0.361          - 0.718 ***   - 0.177          - 0.479         0.158          - 0.444         - 0.727 ***   - 0.224        
    [0.187]        [0.266]        [0.254]        [0.184]        [0.240]        [0.330]        [0.299]        [0.256]        [0.193]        [0.251]      
  GDP  0.134          0.012          0.133          - 0.128          0.165          - 0.029         0.049          0.018          - 0.062          0.143        
    [0.219]        [0.210]        [0.309]        [0.185]        [0.267]        [0.290]        [0.217]        [0.292]        [0.207]        [0.282]      
  CPI  0.045          - 0.374 *       - 0.125          - 0.200          0.083          - 0.209         - 0.729 ***   0.319          - 0.285          - 0.105        
    [0.215]        [0.215]        [0.315]        [0.271]        [0.333]        [0.290]        [0.239]        [0.308]        [0.293]        [0.351]      
  OPENEC  - 0.137          - 0.046          0.093          - 0.013          - 0.048          - 0.068         0.368 *       - 0.077         0.004          - 0.042        
    [0.185]        [0.193]        [0.265]        [0.172]        [0.236]        [0.249]        [0.180]        [0.232]        [0.194]        [0.250]      
Notes:  Point estimates from OLS; heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.  * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, **signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ***signiﬁcant at 1 percent. Dependent 
variable is the average growth rate of ﬁnancial development between 2004 and 2008. RFI is measured by a dummy variable taking the value 1, if a country is member of an RFI project, 
and otherwise 0. 


























Table 5.4  
Regression results: Regional financial integration, financial development, and institutional development [Regulatory Quality [RQj]] 
 
    SSA              excl. outliers       
Dependent Var.  PCGDP  LIQUID  NIMG  CIR  OVHD      PCGDP   LIQUID  NIMG  CIR  OVHD 
Num.of Obs.  46  46  41  41  42  44  45  39  40  42 
R square      0.435            0.556          0.268         0.605          0.192           0.185         0.525          0.433         0.546          0.131        
Adj.R square    0.270            0.415          - 0.017         0.459          - 0.090           - 0.074         0.366          0.185         0.360          - 0.189        
Column    [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]    [6]  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10] 
Coeff.  RFI    0.166            - 0.453 **       - 0.020         - 0.255            - 0.263           - 0.428          - 0.643 **       0.204           - 0.270            - 0.283        
      [0.217]          [0.218]          [0.325]         [0.269]          [0.332]         [0.281]         [0.228]          [0.329]          [0.296]          [0.347]      
  CC    - 0.436           0.348            - 0.493         - 0.206            0.012           0.408           - 1.090 ***     0.126           - 0.111            - 0.043        
      [0.278]          [0.268]          [0.341]         [0.247]          [0.361]         [0.368]         [0.380]          [0.339]         [0.273]          [0.375]      
  INT[RQ,RFI]    0.295            - 0.021            0.262           0.142            0.181           - 0.291          0.988 ***     0.291           0.056            0.088        
      [0.259]          [0.239]          [0.390]         [0.274]          [0.383]         [0.315]         [0.294]          [0.366]         [0.303]          [0.397]      
  FD[t-4]    0.610 ***     - 0.891 ***     - 0.323         - 0.754 ***     - 0.189           - 0.494 *       0.125            - 0.484 *       - 0.741 ***     - 0.223        
      [0.199]          [0.215]          [0.254]         [0.184]          [0.237]         [0.273]         [0.251]          [0.252]         [0.197]          [0.249]      
  GDP    0.159            - 0.070            0.209          - 0.089            0.128           - 0.009          0.102            - 0.062          - 0.025            0.109        
      [0.244]          [0.234]          [0.328]         [0.197]          [0.275]         [0.314]         [0.232]          [0.315]         [0.219]          [0.291]      
  CPI    0.108            - 0.420 *         - 0.113         - 0.213            - 0.010           - 0.191          - 0.718 ***     0.255           - 0.284            - 0.176        
      [0.222]          [0.215]          [0.326]         [0.278]          [0.339]         [0.285]         [0.228]          [0.312]         [0.300]          [0.355]      
  OPENEC    - 0.234           0.062            0.050          - 0.045            0.018           - 0.059          0.437 **        - 0.031          - 0.030            0.024        
      [0.213]          [0.229]          [0.283]         [0.188]          [0.246]         [0.276]         [0.195]          [0.242]         [0.213]          [0.262]      
Notes:  Point estimates from OLS; heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.  * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, **signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ***signiﬁcant at 1 percent. Dependent 
variable is the average growth rate of ﬁnancial development between 2004 and 2008. RFI is measured by a dummy variable taking the value 1, if a country is member of an RFI project, and 
otherwise 0. 


























Table 5.5  
Regression results: Regional financial integration, financial development, and institutional development [Public Sector Management and Inst. 
[CPIAj]] 
 
    SSA            excl. outliers       
Dependent Var.  PCGDP  LIQUID  NIMG  CIR  OVHD    PCGDP  LIQUID  NIMG  CIR   OVHD 
Num.of Obs.  41  39  36  35  36    40  39  34  33  35 
R square     0.241          0.569           0.227          0.628            0.277           0.240           0.569            0.380           0.618            0.152        
Adj.R square   - 0.039          0.392           - 0.160          0.428           - 0.084          - 0.055           0.392            0.019           0.375           - 0.304        
Column    [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10] 
Coeff.  RFI    - 0.035          - 0.459 *         0.041           - 0.367            - 0.425           - 0.634 *       - 0.459 *         - 0.035          - 0.393            - 0.283        
      [0.293]         [0.248]          [0.381]         [0.328]          [0.357]         [0.314]         [0.248]          [0.437]         [0.362]          [0.407]      
  CC    0.401           - 1.055 ***     - 0.330          - 0.152            0.193           0.057           - 1.055 ***      0.008           0.019            0.204        
      [0.370]         [0.348]          [0.312]         [0.234]          [0.333]         [0.396]        [0.348]          [0.319]         [0.242]          [0.344]      
  INT[CPIA,RFI]    - 0.262          0.539 *         0.071           0.305            0.240           0.193           0.539 *         0.260           0.241            - 0.125        
      [0.346]         [0.301]          [0.372]         [0.304]          [0.376]         [0.373]         [0.301]          [0.374]         [0.337]          [0.404]      
  FD[t-4]    - 0.493 *       0.384            - 0.311          - 0.766 ***      - 0.276           - 0.257          0.384            - 0.425          - 0.933 ***     - 0.338        
      [0.240]         [0.224]          [0.277]         [0.243]          [0.262]         [0.257]         [0.224]          [0.274]         [0.261]          [0.291]      
  GDP    0.152           - 0.041            0.044           - 0.031            0.056           0.101           - 0.041            0.010           0.173            0.002        
      [0.243]         [0.192]          [0.289]         [0.217]          [0.279]         [0.252]         [0.192]          [0.268]         [0.239]          [0.315]      
  CPI    0.137           - 0.688 **       - 0.032          - 0.317            - 0.153           - 0.329          - 0.688 **        0.223           - 0.452            - 0.220        
      [0.284]         [0.247]          [0.355]         [0.338]          [0.369]         [0.308]         [0.247]          [0.348]         [0.361]          [0.400]      
  OPENEC    - 0.323          0.344 *         0.020           0.076            0.189           0.052           0.344 *         - 0.295          0.096            0.155        
      [0.231]         [0.182]          [0.307]         [0.245]          [0.301]         [0.248]         [0.182]          [0.280]         [0.265]          [0.338]      
Notes:  Point estimates from OLS; heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.  * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, **signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ***signiﬁcant at 1 percent. Dependent 
variable is the average growth rate of ﬁnancial development between 2004 and 2008. RFI is measured by a dummy variable taking the value 1, if a country is member of an RFI project, and 
otherwise 0. 

























   
Table 5.6  
Regression results: Regional financial integration, financial development, and institutional development [State Fragility [SFIj]] 
 
    SSA            excl. outliers       
Dependent Var.  PCGDP  LIQUID  NIMG  CIR  OVHD  PCGDP  LIQUID  NIMG  CIR  OVHD 
Num.of Obs.  43  41  39  40  41  41  41  37  38  40 
R square      0.457            0.509            0.314           0.643            0.304           0.234           0.509            0.410           0.569            0.237        
Adj.R square    0.275            0.329            0.032           0.504            0.048          - 0.048           0.329            0.135           0.380           - 0.059        
Column    [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10] 
Coeff.  RFI    0.147            - 0.502 *         0.105           - 0.167            - 0.380           - 0.209          - 0.502 *         0.218           - 0.251            - 0.410        
      [0.235]          [0.244]          [0.296]         [0.239]          [0.295]         [0.315]         [0.244]          [0.301]         [0.268]          [0.313]      
  CC    0.432            0.654            0.697           0.490            - 0.529           - 0.089          0.654            - 0.011          0.351            - 0.618        
      [0.362]          [0.403]          [0.409]         [0.304]          [0.498]         [0.453]         [0.403]          [0.446]         [0.354]          [0.512]      
  INT[SFI,RFI]    - 0.316           - 1.043 ***     - 0.455          - 0.447            0.140           - 0.168          - 1.043 ***     - 0.335          - 0.339            0.477        
      [0.348]          [0.351]          [0.427]         [0.301]          [0.491]         [0.422]         [0.351]          [0.449]         [0.349]          [0.493]      
  FD[t-4]    0.582 ***     - 0.182            - 0.301          - 0.715 ***     - 0.188           - 0.515 *       - 0.182            - 0.381          - 0.717 ***     - 0.306        
      [0.186]          [0.231]          [0.246]         [0.186]          [0.234]         [0.259]         [0.231]          [0.250]         [0.202]          [0.249]      
  GDP    0.150            - 0.134            0.138           - 0.137            0.109           - 0.024          - 0.134            0.005           - 0.074            0.152        
      [0.226]          [0.224]          [0.296]         [0.184]          [0.250]         [0.271]         [0.224]          [0.296]         [0.212]          [0.267]      
  CPI    0.061            - 0.739 **       - 0.145          - 0.211            0.003           - 0.040          - 0.739 **       0.217           - 0.308            - 0.134        
      [0.255]          [0.258]          [0.320]         [0.264]          [0.318]         [0.337]         [0.258]          [0.327]         [0.293]          [0.336]      
  OPENEC    - 0.069           0.379 **        0.189           0.003            - 0.132           - 0.122          0.379 **        - 0.209          0.022            - 0.061        
      [0.179]          [0.178]          [0.239]         [0.165]          [0.224]         [0.251]         [0.178]          [0.234]         [0.195]          [0.244]      
Notes:  Point estimates from OLS; heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.  * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, **signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ***signiﬁcant at 1 percent. Dependent 
variable is the average growth rate of ﬁnancial development between 2004 and 2008. RFI is measured by a dummy variable taking the value 1, if a country is member of an RFI project, and 
otherwise 0. 






Table 5.7: Estimated effects of RFI on average growth rate (2004-2008) of financial 
development to GDP in SSA for given level of institutional development (non-RFI countries, 
1 = 100 percent) 
 
Country  Total Effect:     
Inst.Q.  CCj  ROLj  RQj  SFI 
Dep. Var.  LIQUIDj  LIQUIDj  LIQUIDj  LIQUIDj 
Outliers  excl.  excl.  excl.  incl./excl. 
Angola                    -0.080  -0.069  -0.065  -0.068 
Botswana                  0.184  0.132  0.167  0.256 
Burundi                   -0.054  -0.053  -0.081  -0.068 
Cape Verde                0.133  0.120  0.060  n.a. 
Congo, Dem. Rep.          -0.095  -0.108  -0.116  -0.160 
Eritrea                   0.048  -0.032  -0.187  0.025 
Ethiopia                  -0.007  -0.001  -0.041  -0.091 
Gambia, The               -0.010  0.042  0.034  0.048 
Ghana                     0.060  0.061  0.073  0.048 
Guinea                    -0.056  -0.076  -0.060  -0.045 
Guinea-Bissau             -0.057  -0.064  -0.062  -0.021 
Liberia                   -0.028  -0.061  -0.123  -0.091 
Madagascar                0.061  0.033  0.051  0.094 
Malawi                    -0.006  0.042  0.020  0.025 
Mauritania                0.019  -0.009  0.047  0.002 
Mauritius                 0.124  0.162  0.167  n.a. 
Mozambique                0.005  0.003  0.023  0.002 
Nigeria                   -0.058  -0.062  -0.043  -0.091 
Rwanda                    0.037  -0.002  0.003  -0.091 
São Tomé and Principe     -0.002  0.015  -0.017  n.a. 
Seychelles                0.096  0.081  -0.031  n.a. 
Sierra Leone              -0.051  -0.046  -0.052  -0.114 
Somalia                   -0.141  -0.185  -0.264  -0.160 
Sudan                     -0.084  -0.083  -0.081  -0.160 
Zambia                    -0.006  0.014  0.014  -0.045 
Zimbabwe                  -0.087  -0.109  -0.222  -0.021 
         
Mean  -0.002  -0.010  -0.030  -0.033 
         
 
Threshold  -0.617  -0.667  -0.639  16 
 




5.2 RFI and financing conditions for enterprises 
There is a rich empirical literature investigating the effects of international financial integration on 
access to finance in less developed countries and emerging markets, mostly focusing on the effects of 
penetration by financial institutions from advanced countries (see e.g. Clarke et al. 2006; Detragiache 
et al., 2008; Degryse et al., 2009). The role of RFI for credit constraints of firms has mainly been 
examined for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. De Haas and Naaborg, 2005, 2006; 
Volz, 2004, 2008). To our knowledge, however, there are no studies investigating the effects of RFI 
on firms’ access to finance in SSA countries. 
 
5.2.1  Data and methodology 
To measure the effect of RFI on financing conditions in SSA we use the following specification: 
FCj = α0 + α1RFIj + α2CONj + α3FBIj + α4CBCj + α5SOBj + α6PCGDPj + α7CPIj + α8GROWTHj + 
α9OTHCONSj + εj 
The set of variables and the algebraic structure are based on Volz (2008) but were modified for our 
purposes. The variables are constructed as follows. 
Financing Conditions: FCj denotes the financing condition of country j, i.e. the variable describes how 
hard and costly it is for enterprises to obtain funds. To calculate an indicator form this variable we use 
micro data from enterprise surveys conducted by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the 
World  Bank  (2010).  They  include  data  from  about  13,000  enterprises  from  34  SSA  countries 
regarding access to finance and costs of finance. In those surveys, interviewed entrepreneurs indicated 
whether they perceive access to finance as “no obstacle”, a “minor obstacle”, a “moderate obstacle”, a 
“major obstacle”, or a “very severe obstacle”. These are our access to finance data. Moreover, the 
interviewees were asked to estimate the average amount of collateral which they have to pay relative 
to the amount of loan. These are the costs of finance data. The enterprise surveys also distinguish 
between three different sizes of enterprises (small, medium, and large). Small are those enterprises 
with less than 20 employees, large enterprises have more than 100 employees, and the others are 
medium. We aggregate the access to finance data and calculate the following ratios: 
 
where ej denotes the numbers of enterprises in country j, sej the number of small enterprises, and lej 
the number of large enterprises. The variables with an asterisk denote the number of credit constrained 
enterprises. Enterprises are classified as credit constrained when they describe access to finance as a 
“severe obstacle” in the enterprise survey. Thus, for instance, le
*
j is defined as the number of large 
enterprises in country j that face credit constraints. Therefore, AFj denotes the share of enterprises 
facing credit constraint. AFSMALLj is the fraction of the small enterprises facing credit constraint, and 
AFLARGEj the fraction of large enterprises facing credit constraint to all large enterprises. 




where i is the set of all firms, s and l are the sets of small firms and large firms, respectively. They are 
therefore subsets of i. nj denotes the number of all firms i, mj denotes the number of small firms s, and 
kj denotes the number of large firms l; all of them in country j. cij, csj, and clj are the amounts of 
collateral paid by enterprises i, s, and l, respectively. Thus, CFj denotes the average relative collateral 
of all firms, CFSMALLj the average relative collateral of small firms, and CFLARGEj the average 
relative collateral paid by large firms. 
RFI: For RFIj we use the same dummy variable as before. As discussed above, there are various 
theoretical predictions for the effects of RFI on access to and costs of finance. Therefore, from a 
theoretical viewpoint, the coefficient estimate can be either positive or negative. 
Concentration in the banking sector: CONj represents the concentration in country j’s banking sector 
measured by the amount of assets held by the three largest banks compared to the assets of the total 
banking sector. The data source is again Beck et al. (2010). As discussed in Section 3.1.2, the large 
bank barriers hypothesis predicts that banking concentration should have a negative effect on the 
access to finance and a positive effect on the costs of finance of finance for small businesses (i.e., raise 
the cost of finance), as well as a positive effect on the access to finance and a negative effect on the 
costs of finance of large enterprises. In contrast, the monopolistic creditor hypothesis (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1995), argues that a monopolistic creditor can expect firms that obtain a credit today to remain 
customers in the future. Since young (and thus small) firms have low actual cash flows and potentially 
high future cash flows, a monopolistic creditor can take this aspect into account when making loan 
decisions: it can charge actual interest rates which are lower than what would be the market interest 
rate in a comparable competitive situation, and it can charge interest rates which are higher than the 
competitive market rates in the future. In a competitive banking sector, a bank has to require market 
interest rates. The higher future interest rates would drive away the then larger (and more credit 
worthy) businesses to other banks. This leads to higher interest rates for small, young, and risky 
debtors in a competitive market than in a monopolistic one. For the CONj variable we can, therefore, 
explain both directions of the outcome. 
Foreign bank involvement: FBIj stands for the foreign bank involvement in country j. We include this 
variable to test the foreign-owned bank barrier hypothesis outlined earlier. Akin to the large bank 
barriers hypothesis, the foreign bank barrier hypothesis asserts that a dominant role of foreign banks 
should have a negative effect on small enterprises’ access to finance and a positive effect on their costs 
of finance, as well as a positive effect on the access to finance of large enterprises and a negative 
effect on their financing costs. On the other hand, a large part of the literature highlights the positive 
effects of foreign bank entry on the efficiency of the whole banking sector. According to this view, a 
more efficient allocation of credit should therefore have a positive effect on the credit conditions 
regardless of firm size. Therefore, we have two possible outcomes for the coefficient estimate of the 
FBIj variable. We calculate an indicator for FBIj on the basis of data provided by Bureau van Dijk  
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Electronic Publishing (2010). As a proxy we use the ratio of the amount of assets held by foreign 
banks to the amount of assets of the ten largest banks registered by the BankScope database. The 
calculation method is in line with Yeyati et al. (2004) and La Porta et al. (2002), since “data for the 
whole banking system [...] are highly correlated with the data for the top ten banks”(Yeyati et al., 
2004, p. 5).
1 
Cross-border credit: CBCj is the cross border credit extended to country j, that is, the amount of loans 
from external banks reported to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) in country j as a share of 
its GDP. The source is Beck et al. (2010). Cross-border credit should theoretically improve firm’s 
access to and lower their cost of finance. We thus expect to obtain negative coefficient estimates. 
State-owned banks: SOBj captures the role of state-owned banks, measured as the amount of assets of 
state-owned banks relative to the amount of assets of the entire banking sector. For the calculation we 
use the same method as for FBIj, again using BankScope data provided by Bureau van Dijk Electronic 
Publishing (2010). On the one hand, state-owned banks can play a crucial role in providing access to 
finance, when there is an insufficient institutional environment and a lot of “fraudulent bankruptcy” 
(Gerschenkron, 1962, p. 19) leading to little acceptance of the private banking sector by the public. In 
such a case the government can fulfill the role of financial intermediator. Furthermore, state-owned 
banks  are  more  isolated  from  market  forces  and  can  therefore  focus  on  other  goals  than  profit 
maximisation (see Volz, 2008). Those goals can include redistribution motives and therefore state-
owned banks can be more willing to lend to small enterprises. On the other hand, the focus of state-
owned banks on other goals than profit maximisation can have adverse effects on financing conditions 
for small enterprises. Firstly, it may lead to an inefficient allocation of resources (La Porta et al., 
2002), and secondly, it is not evident that the political goals of the government direct the fund flows of 
state-owned bank in a direction which is beneficial for small enterprises. For example, state-owned 
banks  might  tend  to  engage  in  lending  to  influential  political  actors  or  larger  enterprises.  This 
consequently leads to an exclusion of small businesses. Therefore, the variable SOBj can have a 
positive (negative) effect on access to finance (costs of finance), as well as a negative (positive). 
Financial deepening: PCGDPj is the financial deepening in country j. As before, it is calculated as the 
amount of private credit provided by commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions as a share 
of GDP (PCGDP). The source is Beck et al. (2010). Since a deepening of financial markets should 
increase the availability of funds for enterprises, we expect to find a positive coefficient for this 
variable. 
Macroeconomic  stability: CPIj  represents  the  macroeconomic  instability  of  the  respective  country 
measured by the CPI average for the period 2004 to 2008. The data are taken from the World Bank 
(2010c)  World  Development  Indicators  and  Global  Development  Finance.  Since  macroeconomic 
instability increases the risk of investment, financial institutions will ask for a higher risk premium or 
collateral. We should thus expect positive coefficient estimates. 
Macroeconomic performance: GROWTHj denotes the average macroeconomic performance of country 
j between 2001 and 2008, measured by the real annual GDP growth rate. Higher economic growth is 
typically driven by higher investment rates. On the other hand, higher growth rates also invoke an 
increase  in  investment,  since  they  alter  investor’s  expectations.  We  use  an  eight-year  average, 
accounting for lagged effects (World Bank 2010c). We expect a negative coefficient for this variable. 
                                                 
 
1 Yeyati et al. (2004, p. 2) point out that “the regression coefficient between the two variables is 0.8 and the R
2 is 
0.5”. Further details on our calculation method can be provided on request.  
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Other constraints: OTHCONS denotes other constraints to the economic activities of enterprises, i.e. it 
represents  conditions  other  than  credit  constraint  that  might  negatively  affect  the  entrepreneurial 
activities  of  the interviewees. This  variable  takes into  account  that the  indicator of  the  access  to 
finance variable is based on a subjective survey. Therefore, it is possible that interviewees in some 
countries perceive the constraint of access to finance as less severe, because other conditions are even 
more harmful for their business activities. This view is based on Kahneman and Tversky (1979) who 
argue that the underlying value function that determines the judgment of an economic actor includes a 
reference point which can vary depending on the context. For instance, if we assume two economies 
(A and B) where financial institutions have the same willingness to provide loans to enterprises, but 
the enterprises in country A face problems with an epidemic diseases which affects a significant 
percentage of its working population, while this is not the case in country B, this will lead, other things 
equal, to a lower perceived negative value of credit constraints by the enterprises in country B. Since 
we cannot include several variables that could adversely affect business conditions in SSA due our 
small sample size (n = 34), we decide to include the number of AIDS death in 2008 per population as 
a proxy for other constraints on business activities.
2 
This choice is based on the empirical evidence of the negative effects of AIDS on entrepreneurial 
activities (e.g., Fraser et al., 2002), and the relatively broad availability of data.
3 Including a variable 
for the number of AIDS deaths makes sense also for another reason: it would be rationale for banks to 
curtail lending to small businesses, which typically rely on its owner, if they have to fear that the latter 
would fall sick and therefore may not be able to repay. This reasoning would not hold for large 
businesses, since these would not be expected to go bankrupt because of the illness of parts of the 
management.  We  thus  may  also  expect  to  find  a  negative  effect  of  the  OTHCONS  variable  on 
financing conditions, since banks might decide to provide less loans when a high rate of AIDS is 
prevalent.  From  a  theoretical  angle,  an  outcome  in  both  directions  is  possible  for  the  coefficient 
estimate of OTHCONS. 
Table 5.6 gives an overview of the descriptive analysis of the explanatory variables. 
 
                                                 
 
2 Data on AIDS death per population for the previous years are not available. Therefore, we use the data of 2008 
assuming that they highly correlate with the data of the previous years. 
3  We  also  tested  the  following  other  indicators  for  the  OTHCONSj  variable:  post  conflict  status,  average 
secondary enrollment between 2000 and 2004 as a proxy for human capital Deléchat et al. (cf. 2009, p. 15), 
average  percentage  of  the  population  living  in  rural  areas  between  2001  and  2008,  as  well  as  electricity 
consumption per capita. The data source for all the indicators is World Bank (2010c). The results are similar to 
those of the AIDS death indicator. But often there are serious gaps in the dataset and which reduces the R square 
of the estimation. The same applies to the ICRG data on institutional development (cf. Knack, 1999) which we 
used in the former regression. We have 8 missing country data in our survey set and 10 missing data in our 




Table 5.8: Descriptive data of explanatory variables (1 = 100 percent) 
 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  N 
CONj  0.8456  0.1542  38 
FBIj  0.5288  0.3006  34 
CBCj  0.8028  3.5992  34 
SOBj  0.1534  0.1966  38 
PCGDPj  0.2031  0.2850  35 
CPIj  0.0727  4.5323  35 
GROWTHj  0.0464  0.0267  34 
OTHCONSj  0.0017  0.0019  34 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
5.2.2  Results 
Table 5.7 depicts the regression results. Columns 1 to 3 show the results for the access to finance 
regression; Columns 4 to 6 for the costs of finance regression. We find a relatively high adjusted R 
square for all dependent variables except AFLARGEj and CFj. We also test for robustness against 
outliers applying the same method as before. Furthermore, we face no problems with multicollinearity. 
The results show no significant effect of RFI on access to finance of all firms in the aggregate. We 
also  find  no  significant  effect  on  the  credit  conditions  of  large  enterprises.  However,  there  is  a 
significant positive effect of RFI on the credit constraints of small enterprises (AFSMALLj), suggesting 
that RFI impedes small firms’ access to finance. Furthermore, there is a significant positive influence 
of foreign bank involvement on the severity of the credit constraint for small enterprises, while we 
don’t find such an influence for large enterprises. These results provide some support for the foreign 
bank barrier hypothesis in the context of RFI. 
We find no evidence for the large bank barriers hypothesis in the context of RFI based on the 
arguments of Berger et al. (2001) and Chick and Dow (1994). We do find a negative coefficient for 
CONj on large banks’ access to finance, suggesting that concentration in the banking sector serves 
large banks well, but this effect is not significant. 
A surprising result is the positive coefficient estimate for PCGDPj, which is significant for small 
firms and hence indicating a negative influence of financial deepening on access to finance for small 
enterprises. 
Furthermore, we find significant results for the variables CPIj and GROWTHj that are in line with 
theoretical predictions. Higher macroeconomic instability negatively affects the credit conditions for 
all enterprises in aggregate (that is, we find the expected coefficient estimates for CPIj). This effect is 
mainly  driven  by  the  negative  effects  on  small  enterprises.  In  addition,  we  find  that  better 
macroeconomic performance leads to a reduction of credit constraints for enterprises. If we distinguish 
between large and small enterprises, we find that the effect is significant for small enterprises but not 


























Table 5.9  
Regression results: RFI and financing conditions for small and large enterprises in SSA 
 
Dependent Var.  AFj  AFSMALLj  AFLARGEj    CFj  CFSMALLj  CFLARGEj 
Num.of Obs.  34  34  34    34  34  34 
R square    0.6648  0.6482  0.4641    0.6061  0.8340  0.9212 
Adj.R square  0.4328  0.4047  0.0931    0.1631  0.5851  0.7439 
Column    [1]  [2]  [3]    [4]  [5]  [6] 
Coeff.  RFIj  0.3538  0.5422 *  0.2247    -0.6392  -0.4709  0.4130 
    [0.2563]  [0.2625]  [0.3241]    [0.3599]  [0.2579]  [0.2162] 
  CONj  -0.2766  -0.3195  -0.0714    -0.1211  0.0467  -0.3282 
    [0.1908]  [0.1955]  [0.2413]    [0.2851]  [0.2112]  [0.1602] 
  FBIj  0.3501  0.4490 *  0.2399    -0.6106  -1.0475 **  -0.4175 
    [0.2185]  [0.2238]  [0.2763]    [0.3954]  [0.3631]  [0.3017] 
  CBCj  -0.2307  -0.2749  -0.3927    -0.3789  -0.3848  0.1607 
    [0.1891]  [0.1937]  [0.2391]    [0.2924]  [0.2353]  [0.2193] 
  SOBj  0.2900  0.1757  0.0310    -0.6515  -0.9830 **  -0.4768 
    [0.2671]  [0.2736]  [0.3377]    [0.4373]  [0.3507]  [0.3475] 
  PCGDPj  0.0669  0.4783 **  0.1605    -0.2976  -0.6744 *  -0.7600 * 
    [0.2135]  [0.2187]  [0.27]    [0.361]  [0.3198]  [0.2937] 
  CPIj  1.1071 ***  1.1157 ***  0.5205    -0.1558  -0.7102 *  0.6198 * 
    [0.3378]  [0.3461]  [0.4272]    [0.4755]  [0.3495]  [0.2876] 
  GROWTHj  -1.2095 ***  -1.1550 ***  -0.2329    0.1376  0.5927  -0.4340 
    [0.33]  [0.3381]  [0.4173]    [0.4802]  [0.356]  [0.2769] 
  OTHCONj  -0.7591 ***  -0.7759 ***  -0.8085 **    0.1506  0.0742  0.6812 ** 
    [0.2312]  [0.2368]  [0.2923]    [0.3325]  [0.278]  [0.2306] 
Notes:   Point    estimates    from    OLS;    heteroskedasticity    robust    standard    errors    in   parentheses.      No    constants    reported.    
*  signiﬁcant  at  10  percent,**signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ***signiﬁcant at 1 percent.  First group of dependent variables (AFj , AF 
SMALLj , and AF LARGEj ):  access to ﬁnance measured by the share of (all/small/large) ﬁrms facing credit constraints as a share of 
(all/small/large) ﬁrms.  Second group of dependent variables (AFj , AF SMALLj , and AF LARGEj ):  average collateral paid for credit 
by (all/small/large) ﬁrms as a share of credit amount.  
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Finally, the negative estimates for OTHCONS support the theory that other constraints lead to a lower 
perception of the severity of credit constraints. As we see in Columns 1, 2, and 3 its coefficient is 
negative and significant for AFj, AFSMALLj, and AFLARGEj. 
Turning to the costs of finance regression analysis, we obtain the following results. There are no 
significant effects of RFI on the costs of finance of all firms in the aggregate, or on the financing costs 
of large and small firms. 
However, we now find a negative effect of foreign bank involvement on the costs of finance. This 
result is puzzling, since one might assume costs of finance and access to finance to be influenced by 
all variables in the same way, since we assumed that both are indicators for the same construct, i.e. 
financing conditions. A possible explanation is credit rationing. As pointed out by Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates and collateral are also more likely to engage in 
risky project (the so called adverse selection effect). If interest rates or collateral requirements exceed 
a certain level the average risk of the loan portfolio of banks, the expected loss exceeds the bank’s 
expected return. Therefore, banks require interest rates and collateral requirements below this level 
even  if  this  implies  an  unsatisfied  excess  demand  for  credit.  Instead  of  raising  interest  rates  or 
collateral requirements banks deny loans to borrowers based on qualitative aspects. 
We can support this argument by calculating the correlation coefficients of the costs of finance and 
the access to finance variables. The results show that there is virtually no correlation between access to 
finance and costs of finance.
1 This supports the notion that small enterprises find it hard to get access 
to finance, although costs of finance are low. We can further support this notion by looking at the 
micro data before aggregation. We find that those enterprises describing access to finance as a very 
severe  obstacle  also  tended  to  leave  the  question  for  the  amount  of  collateral  unanswered.
2  This 
implies  that  collateral  is  not  the  primary  reason  for  the  perceived  credit  constraint.  Thus,  credit 
rationing can be an explanation for the seemingly contradictory regression results. 
From this point of view the results of the costs of finance regression do not contradict the results of 
the access to finance regression. The two dependent variables merely represent two different aspects of 
the financing conditions of enterprises. Therefore we can interpret the results in accordance with the 
foreign bank barriers hypothesis in the context of RFI. 
For the control variables we find the following results. We uncover a negative effect of CBCj on costs 
of finance of small enterprises. This is in line with the theoretical predictions stated above. In addition, 
we find a negative coefficient for financial deepening, which means that financial deepening lowers 
the costs of finance of small and large firms. Whereas this is in line with theoretical predictions, it 
points, however, in the opposite direction than the access to finance regression, just like RFIj and FBIj. 
The CPIj results are surprising. On the one hand, we find a positive CPIj coefficient for the costs of 
finance  for  large  enterprises.  This  is  in  line  with  the  theoretical  proposition  that  macroeconomic 
instability increases the riskiness of investment projects and therefore the amount of collateral required 
by banks or the risk premium they demand. On the other hand, we find a significant negative effect of 
CPIj on the costs of finance of small enterprises. A possible explanation is that inflation reduces the 
real cost of credit for debtors. But this would apply also to large firms. Moreover, it would imply that 
banks are not sufficiently pricing in inflation risk. 
                                                 
 
1 We also tested the connection by integrating the costs of finance variables as an explanatory variable in the 
access to finance regression, and vice versa. Here we also find no significant relation. Results are available on 
request. 
2 Information about the micro data are available on request.  
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The  variable  OTHCONSj  should  not  have  an  effect  on  the  costs  of  finance  from  a  theoretical 
perspective. Indeed, the effect of OTHCONSj vanishes when the dependent variable is changed from 
CFj to AFj, and AFSMALLj to CFSMALLj , respectively. The only exception is CFLARGE which is 
significantly affected by the ratio of AIDS death to population. This supports the notion that large 
businesses also suffer from the effects of a high level of AIDS on their human capital. Banks can take 
that into account and require higher collateral even from large businesses when the AIDS death level 
is high. 
Summing up, our results provide support to the notion that RFI has adverse effects on the access to 
finance for small enterprises. We could not find a significant effect of RFI on access to finance for 
large enterprises or all enterprises in aggregate. Furthermore, we find that RFI reduces the costs of 
finance of small as well as large enterprise, but we argue that this effect reaches only a fraction of 
small firms since many small enterprises are excluded from access to financial due to credit rationing. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study provides an analysis of the costs and benefits of RFI for the financial sectors of SSA 
countries. We have tested two hypotheses from the literature on general financial openness. The first 
hypothesis states that RFI entails financial development; the second that it has adverse effects on the 
financing conditions of small enterprises. We have identified CMA, EAC, UEMOA, and CEMAC as 
four RECs that engage in RFI more than other economic communities in SSA. Subsequently, we 
analysed how the membership in one of these four RFI projects explains cross-country differences in 
financial development as well as access to and costs of finance for small and large enterprises. 
With regard to the relation between RFI and financial development, the results suggest that RFI 
contributes  to  the  overall  size  of  the  financial  sector  if  a  certain  level  of  institutional  quality  is 
prevalent. If such a level of institutional quality was lacking, we found a negative effect of RFI on 
financial development. However, the results apply only to a very broad measure of the size of the 
financial sector, including the liabilities of the central banks. We could not identify any particular 
significant effect on the size of the private financial sector. Moreover, a significant influence of RFI on 
the efficiency of the banking sector could not be identified. 
Regarding the analysis of the effects of RFI on access to and costs of finance of enterprises in SSA, 
results  were  mixed.  Whereas  RFI  shows  a  positive  effect  on  credit  constraints  measured  by  the 
subjective assessment of small enterprises, we found no effect on credit constraints measured in terms 
of small enterprises’ costs of finance. Furthermore, there is a significant positive influence of foreign 
bank involvement on the severity of the credit constraint for small enterprises, but a negative effect on 
their costs of finance. We interpreted the results as an indication of the exclusion of small enterprises 
from funds while the overall level of costs of finance remained modest. From this point of view, the 
analysis provides some support for the foreign-owned bank barrier hypothesis stating that RFI and the 
corresponding penetration of the integrating country by foreign banks impede the financing conditions 
of small enterprises. 
Data availability has been a severe constraint in investigating the research question. Most notably, the 
lack of data on bilateral capital flows prevented us from constructing an indicator of the de facto level 
of RFI between SSA countries. The resulting reliance on a dummy variable as an indicator of de jure 
RFI is certainly the most severe limitation of this research project. In particular, it does not allow for 
differentiation of various stages of RFI in the analysis. Moreover, the qualitative construction of the 
dummy is certainly contestable. Advocates of integration projects like SADC might point out that the 
treaties and agreements of this large REC resemble those of the EAC. We agree with this notion, yet, 
we wish to underline the importance of overlapping membership as an impeding factor for RFI.  
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Apart from the RFI project definition and the dummy variable, sample size is also a problem. Since 
the regression analysis estimated many insignificant relationships, we would require a larger sample to 
identify  significant  relationships.  This  also  implies  that  we  could  not  include  more  explanatory 
variables in the analysis. 
Furthermore,  the  analysis  faced  the  problem  of  possible  conflation  of  RFI  with  other  politico 
economic indicators that could also influence the dependent variables. For example, RFI is typically 
accompanied  by  trade  integration  processes  that  can  also  affect  financial  development  (cf.  Beck, 
2002). 
The limitations to the analysis highlight the need for further data collection and further empirical 
research. With regard to data collection, our research emphasises that more data on bilateral capital 
flows in SSA are the main bottleneck for investigating the effects of RFI. With regard to further 
research, our study shows that there are also potentially detrimental effects of RFI that are worth to be 
examined further for SSA. 
Despite the limitations of this work, our research contributes first empirical evidence to the debate on 
financial developments effects of RFI in SSA. The study highlights a neglected aspect of RFI in SSA: 
its impact on the financing conditions for small enterprises. In contradiction to the widespread opinion 
that RFI will benefit all parties involved, our work suggests that RFI may in some cases have little 
benefit  or  even  adverse  effects  for  small  enterprises.  This  notion  is  important  for  the  academic 
discourse on RFI, but even more so for the political sphere. RFI enjoys high priority on the political 
agenda  of  various  SSA  countries.  Our  research  suggests  that  further  discussion  on  the  costs  and 
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